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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a game theoretical ad-
versarial intervention detection mechanism for reliable smart
road signs. A future trend in intelligent transportation systems is
“smart road signs” that incorporate smart codes (e.g., visible at
infrared) on their surface to provide more detailed information
to smart vehicles. Such smart codes make road sign classification
problem aligned with communication settings more than conven-
tional classification. This enables us to integrate well-established
results in communication theory, e.g., error-correction methods,
into road sign classification problem. Recently, vision-based road
sign classification algorithms have been shown to be vulnerable
against (even) small scale adversarial interventions that are
imperceptible for humans. On the other hand, smart codes
constructed via error-correction methods can lead to robustness
against small scale intelligent or random perturbations on them.
In the recognition of smart road signs, however, humans are out
of the loop since they cannot see or interpret them. Therefore,
there is no equivalent concept of imperceptible perturbations
in order to achieve a comparable performance with humans.
Robustness against small scale perturbations would not be
sufficient since the attacker can attack more aggressively without
such a constraint. Under a game theoretical solution concept, we
seek to ensure certain measure of guarantees against even the
worst case (intelligent) attackers that can perturb the signal even
at large scale. We provide a randomized detection strategy based
on the distance between the decoder output and the received
input, i.e., error rate. Finally, we examine the performance of
the proposed scheme over various scenarios.
Index Terms—Game theory; Autonomous driving; Traffic sign
recognition; Adversarial classification; Certifiable machine learn-
ing.
I. INTRODUCTION
MACHINE learning is one of the key enabling technolo-gies for autonomous vehicles. An autonomous vehicle
can learn how to recognize the surroundings and can base its
strategic decisions on the information learnt. It is only a matter
of time for autonomous driving to replace of human drivers
completely. However, for the time being, there are still impor-
tant, yet not completely addressed, challenges for autonomous
driving. Road-sign classification is one of these challenges.
Varying weather conditions, changing lighting throughout the
day and occlusion are known to pose challenges to road-sign
recognition/classification in real-time [1]. However, recently,
it has been shown that there can also be physical adversarial
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modifications, e.g., stickers or graffiti, on the road signs to
mislead the classification algorithms [2].
A. Prior Literature
In the field of intelligent transportation systems, there have
been extensive effort to mitigate the former challenge [3]–
[9]. In [3], the authors have studied convolutional neural
networks trained according to hinge loss stochastic gradient
descent to achieve fast and stable convergence rates with
substantial recognition performance. In [4] and [5], the authors
have proposed text-based detection systems for traffic panels
that could include information that can vary substantially.
Computational complexity of the recognition algorithms plays
a significant role for real-time applications since autonomous
vehicles are time-critical systems [6], [7]. In [6], the authors
have sought to enhance the performance of convolutional neu-
ral networks for faster performance in real-time applications
through localization of the traffic-signs in the input images
based on their types. In [7], the authors have proposed kernel-
based extreme learning machines with deep perceptual features
to achieve comparable performance to hinge-loss stochastic
gradient based convolutional neural networks (proposed in [3])
with reduced computational complexity. Tree-based hierarchi-
cal structures have also been proposed to achieve coarse-to-
fine road sign detection [8], [9].
Different from the previous works [3]–[9], however, in this
paper, we seek to address the latter challenge, i.e., road-sign
classification in adversarial environments, where there can
be an intelligent attacker modifying road signs physically as
exemplified in [2]. Especially for vision-based classification
algorithms, it is an important issue that an attacker could
craft the input through perturbations that are imperceptible
for humans (i.e., a human would still easily classify the
input correctly) while the algorithm classifies the input as the
attacker’s targeted class [2], [10]–[13]. Such an input sample is
called adversarial example [10]. Recently, substantial amount
of defense methods have been proposed to make machine
learning algorithms robust against adversarial scenarios. These
defense methods have been developed to provide robustness
against certain classes of attacks, and it has been shown that
it is possible to bypass them all via small modification of the
attacks [12].
B. Smart Road Signs
Our goal, here, is to achieve reliable identification of
road signs by smart vehicles without limiting the solution
to learning-based techniques. Particularly, we can view the
road-sign classification problem from a wider perspective as a
communication problem. The road sign and smart vehicle can
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Fig. 1: Examples of a road sign with smart code and an attack (an infrared star-shaped drawing on the right-bottom corner).
be viewed as a transmitter and a receiver, respectively. Then,
the message is the type of the road sign, the signal carrying
that message is the physical road sign, and the signal received
is its digital image taken by the smart vehicle. The relation in
between the signals sent and received, i.e., physical road sign
and its digital image, can be modeled via a noisy channel
that can lead to errors in the transmitted message. Based on
this viewpoint, we can reconfigure this information flow by
also designing the signal, i.e., the physical road sign, via the
well-established tools developed in communication theory.
How we can re-design physical road signs and which
medium we can choose to transmit information are only
limited by our imagination and the corresponding financial
burden to adapt the infrastructure. For example, at each road
sign, we could have included road side units that can transmit
the message via dedicated short range communication (DSRC)
radios [14], [15] although there might also be adversarial
interventions on those radio signals [15], [16]. However,
the future trend in road signs is to include (e.g., infrared)
smart codes that can be read by smart vehicles as illustrated
figuratively in Fig. 1b [17], [18]. Such smart codes provide
flexibility in transmiting more information to smart vehicles
instead of just the type of road signs.
Remark. Due to the regularity of smart codes, e.g., see Fig. 1,
we can identify them via image processing techniques instead
of learning-based techniques. For example, in [19], the authors
use a simularity measure to identify the countdown numbers
in a traffic light, instead of traditional number recognition
algorithms. Furthermore, quick response (QR) codes constitute
another example where we can incorporate image processing
techniques to identify the underlying code, e.g., [20].
We can attain reliable information transmission with cer-
tain formal guarantees when we construct the smart codes
via error-correction methods. Particularly, in coding theory,
error correction methods introduce redundancy to signals, i.e.,
codewords, in order to recover the underlying message as
accurately as possible when there is a noisy channel that
can perturb the signal [21]. Correspondingly, if the amount
of perturbation on the smart code, due to some physical
modifications as seen in Fig. 1d, were less than half of the
minimum distance between any two codewords, then we could
have recovered the underlying codeword without any error.
However, this is not the end of the story as explained below.
C. Motivation
Recall that physical adversarial examples in visual tasks are
defined as inputs crafted by an intelligent attacker in order
to mislead the classification algorithms while a human can
still classify it accurately without any difficulty [2], [13].
This challenge is important to mitigate in order to attain a
comparable performance with human drivers. However, such
a threat model is not appropriate for smart codes since they
will not be visible to humans and even if they were visible,
they are not interpretable by humans manually easily. Since
humans are out of the loop, there will not be such a constraint
limiting the perturbation amount on the attack that we are
seeking to defend against. In the literature of communication
in adversarial environments [22], [23], it is evident that it will
not be sufficient for smart codes to be robust against just small
scale perturbations if the adversary is powerful to launch large
scale perturbation. Therefore, we introduce a new threat model
where the intelligent adversary can also perturb the input at
large scale in order to lead to erroneous decoding.
Given a codeword received, our goal is to detect whether
there exists an adversarial intervention or not, e.g., as illus-
trated in Fig. 1e. Note that the perceived codeword might
differ from the original codeword not only due to adversar-
ial intervention but also due to random perturbations that
inevitably appear in the process of interpreting the infrared
image of the smart code. Indeed, the presence of such random
perturbations is the main reason to incorporate error correction
methods while constructing the smart codes. Note also that an
intelligent attacker attacks by taking the detection mechanisms
into account. Correspondingly, while designing the detection
strategy, we need to anticipate the reaction of the attacker.
However, one-level depth reasoning where the detector designs
the strategy by anticipating the reaction of the attacker would
not be effective if the attacker has taken this proactive defense
into account and has reacted in a way that can undermine
it. In [12], the authors have shown this phenomenon by
bypassing the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms through
strategic modification of the attack (those mechanisms defend
against). To mitigate this issue, we propose to design the detec-
tion strategies under the solution concept of game theoretical
equilibrium [24]. However, this paper is definitely not the first
one approaching the adversarial classification (or intervention
detection) problem through a game-theoretical lens. In the
following, we review these studies.
3D. Game Theoretical Approaches
In [25], the authors have introduced a non-zero sum game
between an attacker and a classifier; however, they have not
studied any notion of equilibrium. In [26], [27], the authors
have studied adversarial prediction problems for a certain class
of learners, e.g., support-vector-machines, in terms of Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria, respectively. Recently, in [28], the
authors have analyzed adversarial binary-classification as a
non-zero sum game between an attacker and a classifier. The
classifier seeks to detect whether the input is coming from
the attacker or from a known benign-distribution. On the
other side, the attacker seeks to maximize his reward (which
depends on the input) without being detected by the classifier.
The authors have shown that the classifier can restrict the
strategies to mixtures of classifiers setting threshold on the
reward of the attacker without any loss of generality. However,
the results in [28] cannot be extended to our problem setting
since the codeword attacked can also be perturbed randomly
in the process of reading it. Due to that randomness, different
attacks with different rewards can lead to the same codeword
received. Therefore, given the received codeword, the defender
cannot know the attacker’s reward to compare it against such
a threshold.
E. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose an adversarial intervention de-
tection mechanism for smart road signs in order to ensure
reliable recognition by smart vehicles. We model the interac-
tion between the detection mechanism and attackers as a zero-
sum Stackelberg game [24] where the detector is the leader.
Particularly, attackers can attack road signs by physically mod-
ifying their smart codes at large or small scales, as illustrated
in Fig. 1d, while knowing the detection mechanism. The
detector seeks to minimize a performance metric that includes
cost of losing the opportunity of preventing future attacks by
not being able to detect it now, cost of adversary-induced
decoding errors or failures, false alarm cost, and easiness
of deceptive perturbations. Against the worst-case attacker
who seeks to maximize the detector’s performance metric,
the detector designs a randomized detection rule based on
the distance between the received codeword and the decoder
output, i.e., error rate.
The game theoretical solution concept yields that the de-
tector needs to anticipate the attacker’s best reaction to the
proposed detection policy. However, large size of the attacker’s
strategy space can lead to computational issue while comput-
ing the best detection rule offline. To this end, we examine the
attacker’s actions and show that the attacker can be viewed as
selecting an action from a quotient space of the actual attack
space with respect to a certain equivalence relation, which
will be described in detail in Subsection IV-A. However, that
quotient space can still be large to search over if there are
many distinct road signs. Accordingly, we provide a method
to relax the attack space to address such computational issues
in Subsection IV-C. This conservative relaxation where the
attacker is viewed to possess more power than in practice
enables us to transform the problem into an efficient linear
program (LP) with substantially smaller size. In addition to
game theoretical results, we also analyze the performance of
the proposed detection mechanism numerically over various
scenarios.
Our main contributions are as follows:
● To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in
the literature to address adversarial intervention on smart
road signs within a game theoretical framework.● The randomized detection rule developed under the so-
lution concept of game theoretical equilibrium ensures
robustness against the worst-case attacker that attacks to
maximize the cost for the detector while knowing the
detection mechanism.● By relaxing the attacker’s strategy space, we provide
an efficient (offline) LP-based algorithm to compute the
best randomized detection strategy, which can reduce the
verification complexity.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we provide
preliminary information about error-correction coding. In Sec-
tion III, we formulate the problem. In Section IV, we analyze
the equilibrium of the game. We provide numerical examples
in Section V. We conclude the paper and identify possible
research directions in Section VI.
NOMENCLATURE
Problem Setting:[n, k, d]q linear block code
n ∈ Z codeword length
k ∈ Z message length
d ∈ Z (minimum) distance of the code
do = ⌊(d − 1)/2⌋ error-correction diameter
Σ alphabet of the symbols
q = ∣Σ∣ alphabet size
Σn set of all codewords
Σno ⊂ Σn set of encoded codewords
Σnd ⊂ Σn set of decodable codewords
xo ∈ Σno encoded codeword
y ∈ Σn received (noisy) codeword
yˆ ∈ Σno decoder output for decodable y
p(y∣x) noisy channel
p(xo), xo ∈ Σno probability of xo ∈ Σno
pe ∈ [0,1] probability of error in a symbol
H ∶ Σn ×Σn → Z Hamming distance
Game Setting:G road-sign classification gamePA AttackerPD Detector
U(α,pi) PD’s cost function
pi ∈ [0,1]do+1 PD’s randomized detection rule
ao ∈ Σno attacked codeword
ax ∈ Σn crafted codeword
a = (ao, ax) PA’s (pure) actionA = Σno ×Σn PA’s action space
α = {αa} ∈ ∆∣A∣−1 PA’s mixed strategy
` ∶ Σno ×Σn → {0,1} loss due to decoding error/failure
γj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,4 multiplicative factors
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Fig. 2: A figurative illustration of the interaction in-between PA and PD. PA selects which road sign to attack and attacks its
codeword by changing the symbols physically as exemplified in Fig. 1d. PD observes a noisy version of the codeword and
seeks to detect whether there has been an attack or not.
II. PRELIMINARIES IN ERROR CORRECTION CODING
Error correction codes provide certain formal guarantees for
the transmission of digital data over noisy channels as long as
the deviation on the message sent due to random/intelligent
noise is less than a certain threshold with respect to a certain
distance metric [21]. Since a smart code can be viewed as a
finite-size block and perturbations can be viewed as Boolean
operations, e.g., flipped bits, we specifically consider linear
block codes, which encode data in blocks. They are called
linear because any linear combination of codewords is also a
codeword. Formally, a linear block code, denoted by [n, k, d]q ,
operates over a finite alphabet of symbols whose size is
denoted by q ∈ Z, and maps k ∈ Z symbols to n ∈ Z
symbols. The (minimum) distance of a block, denoted by
d ∈ Z, is the minimum number of positions where any two
distinct codewords differ, i.e., the Hamming distance [21] in-
between the distinct codewords. The abstraction of the code
via [n, k, d]q enables us to study all the linear block codes in
a unified way.
We emphasize that the Singleton bound [29], [30] that all
linear block codes satisfy is given by
d ≤ n − k + 1, (1)
where the equality holds for Reed-Solomon codes [31]. Fur-
thermore, the minimum distance d implies that the block code
can detect d − 1 symbol errors and correct up to
do ∶= ⌊d − 1
2
⌋ (2)
symbol errors since there exists no other codeword within d−1
diameter of each codeword.
Consider that the number of symbol errors, denoted by e ∈
Z, is more than half of the minimum distance, i.e., e > do.
We say that a decoding error exists if the Hamming distance
between the received codeword and any other codeword is less
than or equal to do, i.e., if we decode it erroneously. Further,
we say that a decoding failure exists if the Hamming distance
between the received codeword and all the other codewords is
more than do, i.e., if the received codeword is not decodable
[32].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider that road signs are encoded into smart codes via
a linear block code [n, k, d]q , and there exist two players: an
attacker (PA) and a detector (PD), as seen in Fig. 2. Given
the encoding-decoding scheme and the underlying statistical
profiles, PD seeks to detect any intervention by PA while PA
seeks to modify the smart codes physically, as exemplified in
Fig. 1d, in order to lead to decoding error/failure stealthily.
Noise Model. The decoder reads a noisy version of the smart
code due to, e.g., lighting-induced blurring or harsh weather
conditions. Let Σn denote the codeword space. Then, we
model this noise via a probability transition mapping p(y∣x)
corresponding to the probability of receiving codeword y ∈ Σn
given that the transmitted codeword is x ∈ Σn. We suppose
that all the symbol errors by nature are equally likely and
independent of each other. We denote the probability that there
can be an error in a symbol by pe ∈ [0,1]. We also suppose that
the change of the symbol to any other symbol in the alphabet
is equally likely in a symbol error.
Remark (Symbol Error). In a codeword, a symbol consists of
multiple contiguous bits. A symbol error occurs if at least
one of these bits is perturbed. Correspondingly, if random
perturbations infect multiple contiguous bits, the number of
symbol errors is an appropriate distance measure. This is
indeed the case in smart road signs due to possible obfuscation
by plants or graffiti or adversarial stickers as studied in [2]
or as illustrated in Fig. 1d. When there are blurring due to
lighting throughout a day, fading colors, or weather conditions,
we would also expect perturbations on multiple contiguous
bits, instead of perturbations on single isolated bits (which
may require surgical-like precision due to the relatively small
size of a single bit). Furthermore, error-correction codes,
e.g., Reed-Solomon codes, provide effective guarantees against
symbol errors.
Defense Model. PD has multiple objectives:
O1) to minimize the cost of losing the opportunity to prevent
future attacks by not being able to detect it now,
O2) to minimize the cost associated with adversary-induced
decoding error/failure,
O3) to minimize the cost associated with false alarms,
5O4) to maximize the number of symbol errors necessary to
deceive the decoder.
We model PD’s cost function as a linear combination of
these objectives with certain multiplicative factors, which give
flexibility to control the weight of the corresponding objective
as desired. This cost function will be defined explicitly in the
game model.
We let Σno ⊂ Σn denote the set of encoded codewords, i.e.,
there exists bijective relation in-between Σno and the set of
road signs. We also let Σnd ⊂ Σn denote the set of decodable
codewords that are within do diameter of a codeword in Σno .
If y ∈ Σnd , we denote the decoder output by yˆ ∈ Σno . The loss
due to decoding error/failure is given by
`(xo, y) = { 0 if y ∈ Σnd and yˆ = xo1 otherwise. (3)
If y ∈ Σnd , PD can report an issue against the possibility of
adversarial intrusion so that further (costly) investigations can
take place. To this end, PD designs a randomized detection
rule pi ∈ [0,1]do+1, where pij , j = 0, . . . , do, corresponds to
the probability of triggering an alert for j symbol errors. If
y ∉ Σnd , further investigations always take place.
Remark (Scalable Defense). We consider a randomized de-
tection rule depending on the number of symbol errors for
scalability. If PD were to select a (randomized) detection rule
based on the received codeword, then PD would select a vector
over the space [0,1]∣Σn∣, which is qn dimensional. Note that qn
is exponential in the number of symbols n whereas do+1 ≪ qn
is linear in n.
Threat Model. PA is the worst case attacker who maximizesPD’s cost function. To this end, PA can select which road sign
to attack. Let ao ∈ Σno denote the codeword of the attacked road
sign. Then, PA can craft ao ∈ Σno to ax ∈ Σn by introducing
error in order to control the decoder output. The complexity of
this crafting is given by the number of symbols changed, i.e.,
H(ao, ax). We denote PA’s action space by A ∶= Σno ×Σn and
denote PA’s action by a ∶= (ao, ax). PA can select a mixed
strategy α = {αa} over A such that αa denotes the probability
of taking action a = (ao, ax) ∈ A, i.e., attacking the codeword
ao ∈ Σno and crafting it to ax ∈ Σn.
Game Model. We consider a zero-sum game setting wherePD seeks to minimize the cost function:
U(α,pi) =γ1 ∑
a∈Aαa
⎛⎝ do∑j=0(1 − pij) ∑y∈Σnd∋H(y,yˆ)=jp(y∣ax)
⎞⎠
+γ2 ∑
a∈Aαa ∑y∈Σn `(ao, y)p(y∣ax)
+γ3 do∑
j=0pij ∑xo∈Σno ∑y∈Σnd∋H(y,xo)=jp(y∣xo)p(xo)−γ4 ∑
a∈AαaH(ao, ax) (4)
against the worst-case PA who seeks to maximize (4). We
define certain multiplicative factors γj ≥ 0, j = 1,2,3,4, cor-
responding, respectively, to PD’s objectives O1)−O4). Note
that minimization of the expected cost due to the uncertainty
of the channel p(y∣x) is in-line with the expectation-over-
transformation framework proposed in [13]. The attackers can
generate robust attacks by considering the expected impact of
the uncertainties due to the channel [13].
Remark (Attack Probability). If PD has a priori information
pa ∈ [0,1] corresponding to the probability of adversarial
intervention, then we can incorporate this into (4) by selecting
the multiplicative factors accordingly. For example, the ob-
jectives O1), O2), and O4) matter if there is an adversarial
intervention while the objective O3) matters if there is no
adversarial intervention. To this end, we can scale up γ1, γ2,
and γ4 by pa while scaling up γ3 by 1 − pa.
We consider a hierarchical setting, where PA can know
(or learn) PD’s randomized detection algorithm, in order
to avoid obscurity based defense, which can be bypassed
when an advanced attacker learns the information in obscurity.
Therefore, this interaction can be modeled as a Stackelberg
zero-sum game1G ∶= (∆∣A∣−1, [0,1]do+1, U, `(⋅), p(y∣x), p(xo),{γj}), (5)
where PD is the leader and PA is the follower. Since PA is
the follower and reacts to PD’s strategy pi ∈ [0,1]do+1, the
problem faced by the detector is given by
min
pi∈[0,1]do+1 maxα∈∆∣A∣−1U(α,pi). (6)
The following proposition shows that there exists an equi-
librium to the game G.
Proposition 1 (Existence Result). There exists a pair ofPD’s strategy and PA’s reaction (pi∗,B(pi∗)) attaining the
Stackelberg equilibrium G, i.e., satisfying (6).
Proof. Note that U(α,pi) is linear, and correspondingly, con-
tinuous in the optimization arguments α ∈ ∆∣A∣−1 and pi ∈[0,1]do+1, and the constraint sets are decoupled. Therefore
the maximum theorem [33] yields that
max
α∈∆∣A∣−1U(α,pi) (7)
is a continuous function of pi ∈ [0,1]do+1. Then, since[0,1]do+1 is a compact set, the extreme value theorem yields
that there exits a solution for (6).
In the following section, we analyze the equilibrium to G.
IV. ADVERSARIAL INTERVENTION DETECTION ACROSS
SMART ROAD SIGNS
Existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed as shown in
Proposition 1. However, computation of the equilibrium can
be demanding (even if it is an offline computation) sincePA has a large strategy space, even for short codewords. In
this section, our goal is to examine PA’s best response for
efficient computation of the best detection rule. To this end,
we first seek to formulate certain equivalence classes overPA’s actions such that all the actions in a class lead to the
same outcome of the game (see, Subsection IV-A). However,
1∆d−1 ⊂ Rd denotes the probability simplex formed by d standard unit
vectors.
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Fig. 3: Figurative illustration of Σn for the Reed-Solomon
Code [7,3,5]q . Suppose the attacked codeword is ao = x1o.
Decodable regions for the codewords x1o, x
2
o, x
3
o ∈ Σno are
shaded and arcs correspond to the levels of symbol errors.
The color coded arrows illustrate figuratively how the corre-
sponding level of symbol error would change with additional
nature-induced noisy perturbation of the crafted codeword.
depending on the size of the input space, i.e., Σn, computation
of the equilibrium may still be demanding for that quotient
space. In order to avoid such a computational issue for long
codewords that can express relatively larger collection of road
signs, we relax the constraints on PA’s action space, which
will lead to more powerful attacker than in practice (see,
Subsection IV-C). This yields a conservative defense, which
leads to lower cost against the actual attacker who is relatively
less powerful in run-time applications. Finally, we transform
the problem into an efficient LP, rather routinely, in order to
apply existing powerful computational tools to compute the
best detection rule. We now provide the details of these steps.
Our goal is to compute the best detection rule pi∗ ∈[0,1]do+1 with respect to the equilibrium (6). To this end,PD needs to anticipate PA’s reaction to any selected detection
rule. However, PA’s action space A has dimension ∣A∣ = qn+k,
which is exponential in n + k. Therefore, finding the best
reaction, i.e., a vector in ∆∣A∣−1, for each detection rule is
computationally demanding. Accordingly, in the following,
we seek to reduce PA’s strategy space without losing the
generality.
A. Equivalence Classes on PA’s Best Response
Fig. 3 provides a figurative illustration of how PA can
attack. Note that error-correction methods ensure that different
encoded codewords are at least a certain number of symbols
away from each other. For the code [7,3,5]q in Fig. 3,
this minimum distance is d = 5 symbols as exemplified in
between x1o and x
2
o. Any perturbation that can change at most
do = 2 symbols does not lead to any decoding error or failure.
However, at certain directions, perturbations on 3 symbols can
lead to a decoding error, e.g., by carrying x1o to the decodable
region of x2o, or a decoding failure depending on how and
which symbols are perturbed. Correspondingly, if PA decides
to attack on ao = x1o, then PA has several choices while
physically damaging the corresponding smart code. In the
following, we categorize those choices into four main groups:
C0) PA may not attack, i.e., may not introduce any error.
C1) PA may introduce relatively smaller amount of symbol
error(s) such that the corrupted codeword is still in the
decodable region of the associated codeword. Due to the
channel, this can still lead to decoding error or failure
with certain probabilities.
C2) PA may introduce symbol errors such that the corrupted
codeword becomes not decodable.
C3) PA may introduce relatively larger amount of symbol er-
rors such that the codeword intervened is in the decodable
region of another codeword.
Even if there were not any detection rule, in Fig. 3, we
observe that not attacking, i.e., C0), or attacking relatively
more aggressively, e.g., C2) and C3), are not necessarily more
preferable for PA than C1) due to the noisy perturbations and
the trade-off between the amount of perturbation and the gain
of PA by decoding error/failure. In the following, we examine
the channel, which can lead to such intriguing results.
Recall that any symbol can be perturbed by the channel
with the same probability pe while the symbol perturbed can
change to any other symbol in the alphabet with the same
probability, i.e., 1/(q − 1). Then, the probability that x turns
into y due to noisy channel can be written as
p(y∣x) = (1 − pe)n−H(y,x) ( pe
q − 1)H(y,x) , (8)
which only depends on the distance in-between y ∈ Σn and x ∈
Σn. Particularly, there are n−H(y, x) symbols that match at x
and y. There should not be any perturbations on those symbols,
which leads to the first multiplicative term on the right-hand-
side of (8). For each symbol that does not match, the random
perturbation must change the one at x to the corresponding
one at y among q − 1 equally likely alternatives, which leads
to the second multiplicative term.
Since p(y∣x) only depends on H(y, x), we define an
auxiliary metric ρ ∶ Z × Z → [0,1], where ρ(n1, n2) denotes
the probability that two codewords that are n1 ∈ Z symbols
away become n2 ∈ Z symbols away when one of them is
randomly perturbed by the channel. Note that we can compute
ρ(⋅) based on combinatorics analytically or using the Monte
Carlo method [34] numerically. With this new auxiliary metric,
let us take a closer look into the objectives O1) and O2),
where the channel and PA have impact on. Firstly, the term
in parenthesis in O1) can be written as
do∑
j=0(1 − pij) ∑y∈Σnd∋H(y,yˆ)=jp(y∣ax) =
do∑
j=0(1 − pij) ∑xo∈Σno ρ(H(xo, ax), j)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
,
(9)
where the under-braced term corresponds to the total prob-
ability that ax moves to j symbols away from an encoded
7codeword due to the random noise. Similarly, we can write
the inner summation in O2) as
∑
y∈Σn `(ao, y)p(y∣ax) = ∑y∈Σn 1{H(ao,y)>do}p(y∣ax) (10)
= 1 − do∑
t=0ρ(H(ao, ax), t), (11)
where the first line follows since a detection error or failure
occurs if the received codeword y ∈ Σn is more than do ∈ Z
symbols away from the codeword ao ∈ Σno before PA crafts it
into ax ∈ Σn. The second line follows by the definition of the
new auxiliary metric ρ(⋅).
Note that O1) written according to (9) depends on the
distance between ax ∈ Σn and all the encoded codewords
xo ∈ Σno . Similarly, only the distance between ao ∈ Σno and
ax ∈ Σn has an impact on O2) and O4) while we also have
ao ∈ Σno . Therefore, the attacks that target ao have the same
impact on the cost function (4) if the distances between ax
and the encoded codewords are the same.
Indeed, there is a strong coupling on how PA would select
ao and ax independent of PD’s strategy. Particularly, (9), and
correspondingly O1), do not include ao ∈ Σno . On the other
side, the objectives O2) and O4), which include ao ∈ Σno , do
not include pi ∈ [0,1]do+1. Therefore for given ax ∈ Σn, PA
can select ao ∈ Σno irrespective of PD’s detection rule. Based
on this observation in the following lemma, we eliminate
weakly dominated actions of PA in order to reduce the size
of PA’s strategy space.
Lemma 1. In the game G, without loss of generality, we can
restrict PA’s action space A intoAd = {(a∗o , ax ∈ Σn)}, (12)
where a∗o is the maximizer of the optimization problem:
max
ao∈Σno γ2(1 − do∑t=0ρ(H(ao, ax), t)) − γ4H(ao, ax). (13)
Proof. The terms corresponding to O2) and O4) in (4) can
be written as
γ2 ∑
a∈Aαa ∑y∈Σn `(ao, y)p(y∣ax) − γ4 ∑a∈AαaH(ao, ax)
= ∑
a∈Aαa(γ2(1 −
do∑
t=0ρ(H(ao, ax), t)) − γ4H(ao, ax)), (14)
which follows by (11). Since PA seeks to maximize the cost
(4), for each ax ∈ Σn, we can compute the associated optimal
attacked codeword, i.e., a∗o , via (13), where a solution is
guaranteed to exists since the constraint set Σno is finite.
Note also that (9), (11), and (13) depend only on the
distances between ax ∈ Σn and all the encoded codewords.
Therefore, for a given detection rule, any other a˜x ∈ Σn
that has the same set of distances to the encoded codewords
would lead to the same cost (4). Correspondingly, we define
another auxiliary function h ∶ Σn → Z∣Σno ∣ such that h(ax) is a
vector whose tth entry, denoted by ht(ax), corresponds to the
distance in-between ax and the tth encoded codeword (with
respect to a certain order in Σno ). Then, given h(ax), (13) can
be written as
r(h(ax)) ∶= max
h̵∈{h(ax)}γ2 − γ4h̵ − γ2 do∑t=0ρ(h̵, t), (15)
where {h(ax)} denotes the set including the entries of the
vector h(ax). We can view r(h(ax)) as the reward of PA
for h(ax). Therefore, by (9), (11), and (15), the cost function
U(α,pi) can be written as
U(α,pi) =γ1 ∑
a∈Ad αa(
do∑
j=0(1 − pij)
∣Σno ∣∑
t=1 ρ(ht(ax), j))
+γ3 do∑
j=0pij ∑xo∈Σno ∑y∈Σnd∋H(y,xo)=jp(y∣xo)p(xo)+ ∑
a∈Ad αar(h(ax)). (16)
The following lemma recaps these results to formulate the
equivalence classes on PA’s best response.
Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, instead of mixing overA, PA can select a mixed strategy across the quotient setAd/ ∼ with respect to the following equivalence relation:
(a∗o , ax) ∼ (a˜∗o , a˜x)⇔ h(ax) = Ph(a′x), (17)
for some permutation matrix P ∈ {0,1}∣Σno ∣×∣Σno ∣.
Proof. The cost function, as written in the form of (16),
depends on ax ∈ Σn only with respect to the distances between
ax ∈ Σn and the encoded codewords xo ∈ Σno while the
specific identities of the encoded codewords do not impact
the cost function. Correspondingly, any permutation of the
distances across the encoded codewords would lead to the
same cost.
In order to facilitate the analysis of the equilibrium, we,
next, seek to write the cost function (20) in a compact form.
B. Equilibrium in Compact Form
Up to now, we have focused on the objectives except O3),
on which PA’s strategy does not have direct impact. Similar
to (9), via the auxiliary functions ρ(⋅) and h(⋅), we can write
O3) as
γ3
do∑
j=0pij ∑xo∈Σno ∑y∈Σnd∋H(y,xo)=jp(y∣xo)p(xo)
= γ3 do∑
j=0pij ∑xo∈Σno p(xo) ∑x˜o∈Σno ρ(H(x˜o, xo), j) (18)
= γ3 do∑
j=0pij ∑xo∈Σno p(xo)
∣Σno ∣∑
t=1 ρ(ht(xo), j). (19)
8By including (19) in (16) and invoking Lemma 2, we can
write the cost function in a way that confines the impact of
the channel into the auxiliary metric ρ(⋅):
U(α,pi) = ∑
a∈Ad/∼
do∑
j=0αapij( − γ1
∣Σno ∣∑
t=1 ρ(ht(ax), j))
+ ∑
a∈Ad/∼αa(r(h(ax)) + γ1
do∑
j=0
∣Σno ∣∑
t=1 ρ(ht(ax), j))
+ do∑
j=0pij(γ3 ∑xo∈Σno p(xo)
∣Σno ∣∑
t=1 ρ(ht(xo), j)). (20)
Consider a certain order over the quotient space Ad/ ∼ such
that, with a slight abuse of notation, αi corresponds to the
mixed strategy for the ith action in Ad/ ∼. For notational
simplicity, we also let κ ∶= ∣Ad/ ∼ ∣ and τ ∶= ∣Σno ∣. Then, (20)
can be written as
U(α,pi) = κ∑
i=1
do∑
j=0αipij( − γ1 τ∑t=1ρ(ht(aix), j))
+ κ∑
i=1αi(r(h(aix)) + γ1
do∑
j=0
τ∑
t=1ρ(ht(aix), j))
+ do∑
j=0pij(γ3 ∑xo∈Σno p(xo)
τ∑
t=1ρ(ht(xo), j)). (21)
which can also be transformed into a compact vectoral form.
To this end, we define the vectors r ∈ Rκ and po ∈ Rτ , whose
ith entries are given by r(h(aix)) and p(xio), respectively. We
also introduce the matrices Φ ∈ Rκ×(do+1) and Φo ∈ Rτ×(do+1)
whose ith row and (j + 1)th column entries are given by
τ∑
t=1ρ(ht(aix), j) and τ∑t=1ρ(ht(xio), j), (22)
respectively. We note the shift at the column entries since we
have pij , j = 0, . . . , do instead of 1, . . . , do + 1. Then, we can
write (20) as
U(α,pi) = −γ1α′Φpi + α′(r + γ1Φ1) + γ3p′oΦopi, (23)
which facilitates the computation of the equilibrium. However,
the size of Ad/ ∼ can lead to computational issues for long
codewords, i.e., large n, even though it has relatively smaller
size compared to A without losing any generality as shown in
Lemma 2. To mitigate this issue, in the following, we relax
the attack space so that the size of the problem can be reduced
further based on the derived equivalence relation (17).
C. Relaxing Attack Space at Large Scales
The cost function in the compact form (23) implies that
we need to focus on the first and second additive terms that
include PA’s mixed strategy in order to reduce PA’s strategy
space. Note that on those additive terms, α is multiplied by
the matrix Φ ∈ Rκ×(do+1) and the vector r ∈ Rκ. We can seek
to exploit certain properties of Φ ∈ Rκ×(do+1) and r ∈ Rκ. To
this end, we will first show that the matrix Φ ∈ Rκ×(do+1) can
be written as in (28), where δi ∈ Zn+1 is a vector which can
be viewed as the histogram of the distances from aix to the
encoded codewords, i.e., h(aix). Next, we will examine h(aix)
in order to formulate necessary conditions on the histogram
δi. By only considering those necessary conditions, we relaxPA’s strategy space such that he/she selects a mixed strategy
from a strategy space with substantially smaller size. Now, we
provide the technical details step by step.
Step-1. A Closer Look at the Matrix Φ: Recall that the ith
row and the (j + 1)th column entry of Φ ∈ Rκ×(do+1) is given
by
τ∑
t=1ρ(ht(aix), j), (24)
where the summation is taken across all the encoded code-
words. However, we can separate this summation into sub-
summations with respect to the distance from aix to the
encoded codewords. In particular, we have
τ∑
t=1ρ(ht(aix), j) = n∑m=0 ∑t∈{1,...,τ}∋H(aix,xto)=m
ρ(ht(aix), j) (25)
= n∑
m=0 δmi ρ(m,j), (26)
where δmi ∈ Z denotes the number of encoded codewords that
are m symbols away from aix, and the second line follows
since ht(aix) = m for all t that satisfies H(aix, xto) = m.
Correspondingly, for each aix ∈ Σn, i = 1, . . . , κ, we define
the following n + 1 dimensional vector
δi ∶= [δ0i ⋯ δni ]′ . (27)
Then, (26) and (27) yield that Φ ∈ Rκ×(do+1) can be written
as
Φ = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
δ′1⋮
δ′κ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρ(0,0) ⋯ ρ(0, do)⋮ ⋱ ⋮
ρ(n,0) . . . ρ(n, do)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=∶R
. (28)
Note that all the entries of δi ∈ Zn+1, i = 1, . . . , κ, are
non-negative integers and sum to the number of all encoded
codewords τ . However, these are not necessarily sufficient
conditions. Note also that we can view the vector δi as the
histogram of the entries of h(aix). Based on this observation,
in the following, we seek for tighter necessary conditions on
δi by examining h(aix).
Step-2. An Upper Bound on minh(⋅): We first examine the
minimum possible distance between an arbitrary codeword and
an encoded codeword. Note that a codeword consists of the
message and redundantly added symbols:
∈Σnucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright[ [message]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶∈Σk [redundant symbols]] . (29)
For each message in Σk, there exists a unique encoded
codeword. Correspondingly the minimum distance between
an arbitrary codeword ax ∈ Σn and encoded codewords, i.e.,
minh(ax), can be at most n − k since the message part of
ax matches with at least one encoded codeword completely.
Therefore, formally, we have
0 ≤ minh(ax) ≤ n − k ∀ax ∈ Σn. (30)
9Step-3. A Gap in the Ordered {h(⋅)}: Since the codewords
are encoded such that they are distributed across Σn with
maximum distance in between them, if an arbitrary codeword
is relatively close to one of the encoded codewords, e.g.,
if it is inside the decodable region, the distances between
that arbitrary codeword and the other encoded codewords are
relatively large. In other words, when we list all the distances
from that arbitrary codeword to the encoded codewords in
ascending order, then there will be a jump between the distance
to the closest one and the distance to the second closest one.
For example, if ax = xo, then there is no other encoded
codeword within a diameter of d − 1 symbols away from ax.
Particularly, if ax ∈ Σn is in a decodable region of an
encoded codeword, e.g., xo ∈ Σno ; then xo is the encoded
codeword closest to ax, i.e., minh(ax) =H(xo, ax), and there
exists only that encoded codeword within d − minh(ax) − 1
diameter.
Step-4. A Contiguousness Assumption on the Ordered{h(⋅)}: We have formulated certain necessary conditions on
the distance from an arbitrary codeword to the closest and
second closest encoded codewords. For the distances to the
other encoded codewords, we observe that at large scales, the
number of messages qk, i.e., the number of encoded code-
words, is significantly larger than the length of the codewords
n. We suppose that if minh(ax) ≤ do, then there exists at least
one encoded codeword at the distances d −minh(ax), . . . , n.
Otherwise, i.e., if minh(ax) > do, there exists at least one
encoded codeword at all the distances starting from the closest
one minh(ax) to n. In particular, formally, we suppose that
{max{d −minh(ax),minh(ax)}, . . . , n} ⊂ h(ax) (31)
since d − minh(ax) ≥ minh(ax) if ax is in the decodable
region of an encoded codeword, i.e., minh(ax) ≤ do = ⌊(d −
1)/2⌋.
Step-5. The Histogram Under Necessary Conditions: Based
on the necessary conditions derived in Steps 2-4, in the
following, we formulate the necessary conditions on δi under
two cases depending on minh(aix). If aix ∈ Σn is in a
decodable region, i.e., minh(aix) ≤ do, then we have
δmi = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if m = minh(aix)
0 if m ∈ {0, . . . , d −minh(aix) − 1},m ≠ minh(aix)∗ otherwise
(32)
where ∗ corresponds to an unspecified positive integer. If aix ∈
Σn is not in any decodable region, i.e., minh(aix) > do, then
we have
δmi = { 0 if m ∈ {0, . . . ,minh(aix) − 1}∗ otherwise (33)
Step-6. Approximation Under Necessary Conditions: Note
that the unspecified entries of δi may not necessarily take
arbitrary values; however, we will relax this and suppose
that the unspecified entries can be set to arbitrary values byPA as long as they are all positive and all entries sum to
τ . As an illustration, when we concatenate δi for different
scenarios where minh(aix) varies from 0 to n − k, we obtain
the following (n + 1) × (n − k + 1) matrix:
0
1⋮
do
do + 1⋮
d − 1
d⋮
n
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ 0
0 1 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ 0⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ 1 0 ⋯ 0
0 0 ⋯ 0/∗ ∗ ⋯ 0⋮ ⋮ ⋰ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ∗ ⋯ ∗ ∗ ⋯ ∗∗ ∗ ⋯ ∗ ∗ ⋯ ∗⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮∗ ∗ ⋯ ∗ ∗ ⋯ ∗
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (34)
where the entry denoted by 0/∗ is 0 if d is even, and is an
unspecified positive integer if d is odd. For example, the first
column corresponds to aix whose minh(aix) = 0, which yields
that the second closest encoded codeword can be as close as
d −minh(aix) = d symbols away.
Step-7. PA’s Relaxed Strategy Space: Based on the relax-
ation that the unspecified entries can take any values, we seek
to reduce PA’s strategy space, which is the main reason of
all the steps we have taken up to now. To this end, we first
recall that the unspecified entries are all positive and add up
to a certain number, which is τ − 1 if minh(aix) ≤ do, and τ
otherwise. Let us consider an arbitrary column in (34), e.g.,
mth column where m > do. Then, the set of all such possible
δi is given by{δ ∈ Zn+1 ∶ δt = 0 if t <m,δt > 0 o.w., and 1′δ = τ}. (35)
Correspondingly, the set of extreme points2 of this set is given
by{ei ∈ Zn+1 ∶ eii = τ −(n−m) and eji = 1 if j ≥m,j ≠ i}. (36)
Note that any point in the set (35) can be expressed as a convex
combination of its extreme points identified in (36).
Therefore, we can express any convex combination of δi,
i = 1, . . . , κ, by a convex combination of the columns of the
matrix3 Λ ∈ Z(n+1)×ν defined in (37), where
ν ∶= do∑
i=0(n − d + i + 1) + n−k∑j=do+1(n − j + 1) (38)
and n − k ≥ do + 1 by the Singleton bound (1). In other
words, under the relaxation, for any given mixed strategy α
across Ad/ ∼, there exists a mixed strategy β ∈ ∆ν−1 over the
columns of Λ such that we have[δ1 ⋯ δκ]α = Λβ, (39)
which, by (28), yields that
α′Φ = β′Λ′R, (40)
where R ∈ R(n+1)×(do+1), as defined in (28).
Step-8. A Closer Look at the Vector r: Next, we seek
to compute the reward r(aix). Recall that the reward for
2We say that a point in a convex set is an extreme point if it cannot be
expressed as a convex combination of two other points from that set.
3We suppose that d is odd, i.e., do = (d − 1)/2. The matrix for the cases
where d is even can be computed accordingly.
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Λ ∶=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ ⋯ 0 0 ⋯
0 0 ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ ⋯ 0 0 ⋯⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ ⋯ 0 0 ⋯
0 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ ⋯ λdo 1 ⋯ λdo+1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 0 0 ⋯
0 0 ⋯ 0 0 ⋯ ⋰ 1 λdo ⋯ 1 λdo+1 ⋯ ⋯ 0 0 ⋯⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ λ1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ ⋯ λn−k 1 ⋯
λ0 1 ⋯ 1 λ1 ⋯ ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 1 λn−k ⋯
1 λ0 ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 1 1 ⋯⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
1 1 ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ 1 1 ⋯ ⋯ 1 1 ⋯
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(37)
λi = { τ − (n − d + i + 1) if i ≤ doτ − (n − i) o.w.
aix depends only on {h(aix)}, as defined in (15). However,{h(ax)} depends only on minh(ax) as shown in Steps 2-
4. Therefore, (31) yields that r(aix) depends mainly on the
distance to the closest encoded codeword. Based on (15) and
(31), we define an auxiliary vector s ∈ Rn−k+1, where si ∈ R,
for i = 0, . . . , n − k, is given by
si ∶= max
h̵∈{0,...,n}γ2 − γ4h̵ − γ2 do∑t=0ρ(h̵, t) (41)
s.t. h̵ = i ∨ h̵ ≥ max{d − i, i + 1},
where ∨ denotes the disjunction operation. This yields that
si ∈ R corresponds to the reward when minh(ax) = i.
Note that for all aix that have minh(aix) =m, the associated
reward is sm. Therefore, with the mixed strategy β ∈ ∆ν−1
introduced in Step-7, we have
r′α = s′ ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1′ ⋱
1′
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=∶S
β, (42)
where S ∈ R(n−k+1)×ν , and the dimensions of the vector 1 at
the ith row is n − d + i if i ≤ do, and n − i if i > do.
Step-9. Transforming PD’s Strategy Space to a Simplex at
a Higher Dimensional Space: Our goal, here, is to transformPD’s strategy into a mixed strategy at a higher dimensional
space in order to be able to transform the problem into an
LP as will be explained in detail later in this section. To this
end, we can view pi ∈ [0,1]do+1 as PD selects do + 1 mixed
strategies over two element sets, e.g., {0,1}. This yields thatPD selects a mixed strategy over the Cartesian product space
of these sets, i.e., ⨉doi=0{0,1}, which is
µ = 2do+1 (43)
dimensional. For example, for do = 1, the correspond-
ing mixed strategy, denoted by σ ∈ ∆µ−1, is over{[1,0,1,0]′, [1,0,0,1]′, [0,1,1,0]′, [0,1,0,1]′}. This yields
that there exists a matrix Π ∈ R(do+1)×µ such that pi = Πσ.
As an example, for do = 1, we have
pi = [1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶=Π
σ. (44)
Step-10. New Compact Form: Eventually, for the relaxed
attack strategies, we can write PD’s cost function in the
following compact form:
β′Ξσ (45)
where β ∈ ∆ν−1, σ ∈ ∆µ−1, and
Ξ ∶= −γ1Λ′RΠ + S′s1′ + γ1Λ′R11′ + γ31p′oΦoΠ, (46)
which follows since we have 1′β = 1 and 1′σ, which yields,
e.g., β′S′s = β′S′s1′σ.
In the following lemma, we provide an LP to compute the
best detection rule.
Lemma 3. After the relaxation of PA’s strategy space, the
best detection rule pi∗ ∈ [0,1]do+1 is given by
pi∗ = Πσ∗ and σ∗ = ω∗
1′ω∗ , (47)
where ω∗ ∈ Rµ is the solution of the following LP:
max
ω∈Rµ 1′ω subject to Ξ+ω ≤ 1, ω ≥ 0, (48)
where the positive matrix4 Ξ+ ∈ Rν×µ+ is defined by
Ξ+ ∶= { Ξ if Ξ is a positive matrixΞ + ( − ξo)11′ otherwise, (49)
where  > 0 and ξo ∈ R is the minimum entry of Ξ.
Proof. Note that by definition, we have
min
σ
max
β
β′Ξσ ≥ max
β
min
σ
β′Ξσ. (50)
We are interested in only the upper value since we seek to
compute the Stackelberg equilibrium where PA selects the
4We say that a matrix is positive if its all entries are positive.
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strategy σ by knowing PD’s strategy β. However, since the
objective functions are linear in the optimization arguments
while the constraint sets are convex, decoupled, and compact,
the minimax theorem [24] shows that
min
σ
max
β
β′Ξσ = max
β
min
σ
β′Ξσ, (51)
which implies that the upper and lower values of the game
are equal and that we have a saddle-point equilibrium in
(45). Therefore, we can apply rather routine transformation
of mixed-strategy equilibrium of zero-sum matrix games into
an LP [24] in order to compute the best detection rule.
A sketch of the routine transformation of (45) into an
LP [24] is as follows: i) we show that the game (45) is
strategically equivalent to a game where the game matrix is
a positive matrix; ii) we can write (45) as the minimization
of PA’s best response; iii) we can obtain a certain necessary
condition on σ in terms of PA’s best response since ∆ν−1 is a
simplex; iv) through a change of variable, we can obtain the
equivalent LP (48).
Corollary 1. The solution for the dual problem of (48), i.e.,
min
ϑ∈Rν 1′ϑ subject to Ξ′+ϑ ≤ 1, ω ≥ 0, (52)
yields that
β∗ = ϑ∗
1′ϑ∗ . (53)
In the following section, we analyze the performance of
the proposed detection mechanism numerically for various
scenarios.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The proposed framework can be applied to any linear
block code since the analytical results are based only on the
abstraction of the code, i.e., [n, k, d]q . Therefore, in order
to compute the detection rule, specific to the underlying
encoding-decoding scheme, we need the configuration of the
code, i.e., [n, k, d]q , and the matrix R ∈ R(n+1)×(do+1), as
defined in (28). At run-time, the detection mechanism triggers
an alert based only on the number of mismatched symbols.
As numerical examples, in this section, we examine the per-
formance of the proposed detection mechanisms for the smart
codes that are constructed via Reed-Solomon coding [31].
Particularly, Reed-Solomon code (RS-Code) is a maximum
distance separable code that maximizes the minimum distance
between any two distinct codewords within the general class
of linear block codes, and it has widely used applications,
e.g., QR codes. The minimum distance of RS-Code [n, k, d]q
is given by
d = n − k + 1, (54)
which is the Singleton bound (1) for the linear block codes.
In practical implementations, the alphabet size is in general
selected a prime power and length of codeword is set n < q,
e.g., often n = q − 1.
As illustrative examples, we examine the performance
of the proposed detection mechanism for the RS-Codes:[7,5,3]8, [7,3,5]8, [11,5,7]16, [11,3,9]16, [15,5,11]16, and
TABLE I: Configuration of the RS-Codes
RS-Code # distinct road signs # bits ν µ do[7,5,3]8 85 = 32768 21 17 4 1[7,3,5]8 83 = 512 21 21 8 2[11,5,7]16 165 = 1,048,576 44 47 16 3[11,3,9]16 163 = 4096 44 47 32 4[15,5,11]16 165 = 1,048,576 60 85 64 5[15,3,13]16 163 = 4096 60 81 128 6
TABLE II: Probability of decoding error/failure for the RS-
Codes over Different Channels. Highlighted cells correspond
to the error/failure probabilities less than 0.02.
RS-Code pe = 0.01 pe = 0.05 pe = 0.1 pe = 0.2[7,5,3]8 0.0020 0.0444 0.1497 0.4233[7,3,5]8 0.0000 0.0038 0.0257 0.1480[11,5,7]16 0.0000 0.0016 0.0185 0.1611[11,3,9]16 0.0000 0.0001 0.0028 0.0504[15,5,11]16 0.0000 0.0001 0.0022 0.0611[15,3,13]16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0181
[15,3,11]16 such that the corresponding distances for the
decodable regions are given by do = 1,2,3,4,5,6, respectively.
For each RS-Code, Table I tabulates the maximum number of
distinct road signs that can be encoded, the number of bits in
the codeword, i.e., n×log2 q (which can give an idea about the
size of the associated smart code), dimensions of the mixed
strategies β ∈ ∆ν−1 and σ ∈ ∆µ−1, and the decodable distance
do ∈ Z. The number of distinct road signs that a code can
express is not directly related to the decodable distance. For
example, [11,5,7]16 can encode as much as around 1 million
distinct road signs, but its decodable distance is 3, which is
less than the decodable distance of [15,3,13]16, which can
encode as much as 4096 distinct road signs.
In order to examine the performance across a range of
relative small to high noise channels, we consider 4 dif-
ferent channels with probabilities of symbol errors: pe =
0.01,0.05,0.1,0.2. For each channel, in Table II, we tabulate
the probability of decoding error/failure for the RS-Codes. We
highlight the error/failure probabilities that are less than 0.02.
Note that a high error rate yields that the associated code
is not reliable even when there is no adversarial intervention.
Correspondingly, if a code leads to a higher error/failure prob-
ability, then we can prefer codes that include more redundancy
to improve reliability.
Next, we compare the reliability of the smart road signs with
respect to the cost metric (4) for the cases with and without
the proposed detection mechanism. For example, we set all the
road signs equally likely and we use the Monte Carlo method
to compute R ∈ R(n+1)×(do+1) over 106 independent trials. We
set the multiplicative factors as
γ1 = γ2 = γ4 = 100 and γ3 = τ, (55)
where we set the weight of the objective O3), i.e., false alarm
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TABLE III: The conservative cost if there were no detection
mechanism.
RS-Code pe = 0.01 pe = 0.05 pe = 0.1 pe = 0.2[7,5,3]8 9,000 36,251 55,564 61,491[7,3,5]8 112 778 1,306 1,683[11,5,7]16 257,750 980,210 1,331,300 1,179,500[11,3,9]16 913 4,750 6,836 6,901[15,5,11]16 379,300 1,313,600 1,628,300 1,152,200[15,3,13]16 1,280 5,774 7,718 6,108
TABLE IV: The conservative cost if there were the proposed
detection mechanism.
RS-Code pe = 0.01 pe = 0.05 pe = 0.1 pe = 0.2[7,5,3]8 2,246 9,579 16,167 22,847[7,3,5]8 100 112 145 214[11,5,7]16 279 19,394 88,599 261,270[11,3,9]16 100 105 160 530[15,5,11]16 100 5,549 39,194 145,690[15,3,13]16 100 100 107 262
TABLE V: Probability of False Alarms
RS-Code pe = 0.01 pe = 0.05 pe = 0.1 pe = 0.2[7,5,3]8 0.0657 0.2884 0.4822 0.6724[7,3,5]8 0.0001 0.0296 0.1082 0.2711[11,5,7]16 0.0002 0.0135 0.0708 0.2259[11,3,9]16 0.0000 0.0013 0.0150 0.1077[15,5,11]16 0.0000 0.0052 0.0106 0.1031[15,3,13]16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0406
cost, in order to keep the probability of false alarm at a certain
range, e.g., less than 10%, for the scenarios where the code
has error/failure probability less than 0.02. In order to solve
the LPs numerically, we use CVX, a package for specifying
and solving convex programs [35], [36].
In order to compute the (conservative) cost for the scenarios
where there is no detection mechanism, we compute
max
β∈∆ν−1 β′Ξσo, (56)
where
σo ∶= [0 . . . 0 1]′ . (57)
Particularly, since the right most column of Π ∈ R(do+1)×µ
is a zero vector, as exemplified in (44), σo ∈ ∆µ−1 yields
that pi = Πσo = 0. In Table III, we tabulate the (conservative)
cost of the codes over the channels examined if there were
no detection mechanism. Note that we highlight the cells
corresponding to the error/failure probabilities less than 0.02
in order to distinguish the scenarios where the associated
RS-Code can be used reliably. In Table IV, we tabulate the
conservative cost of the codes if there were the proposed
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Fig. 4: The probability of the number of symbol errors for
the RS-Codes enumerated in the order of Table I across the
channels enumerated with respect to the probability of symbol
errors pe = 0.01,0.05,0.1,0.2 in that order.
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Fig. 5: The detection rule pi∗ ∈ [0,1]do+1 for the RS-Codes
enumerated across the channels enumerated.
detection mechanism. The corresponding false alarm rates are
provided in Table V. A comparison of Tables III and IV shows
a substantial decrease in the conservative cost at the expense
of a false alarm rate less than 10% in the scenarios where the
error/failure probability is less than 0.02.
Remark. We propose a way to relax certain constraints on
the attack space to mitigate the scalability issue. It can
be possible to obtain tighter approximations by considering
tighter necessary conditions on PA’s actions; however, this
would also increase computational complexity.
Furthermore, in Figs 4, 5, and 6, we provide the probability
of the number of symbol errors due to channels, the proposed
detection rule, and the relax attack strategy, respectively. We
observe that PD triggers alerts if the error rate is relatively
high in general, which turns out to restrain the (powerful)
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Fig. 6: The relaxed attacker strategy β∗ ∈ ∆ν−1, which is a
mixed strategy over the columns of Λ ∈ R(n+1)×ν , as defined
in (37).
attacker to put more weight on the left most columns of
Λ ∈ R(n+1)×ν , as defined in (37), in his/her (relaxed) attack
strategy. Particularly, at the equilibrium, the powerful attacker
ends up crafting the smart code relatively more aggressively
similar to the choice C3) as discussed in Subsection IV-A.
Depending on the channel and the configuration of the code,
the optimal detection rules can vary. Through the proposed
mechanism, based on a game theoretical analysis, we can
compute the best detection rule efficiently and systematically
even at scales of around 1 million distinct road signs using an
average personal computer without difficulty.
VI. CONCLUSION
A future trend in intelligent transportation systems is smart
road signs equipped with smart codes. In addition to incor-
porating relatively larger amount of information, smart codes
constructed via error-correction methods can provide robust-
ness against small scale perturbations. We have introduced a
game theoretical adversarial intervention detection mechanism
for reliable smart road signs against threats that can perturb
the smart codes at small or large scales intelligently. While
designing the detection mechanism, we have considered mul-
tiple performance metrics regarding the cost associated with
losing the opportunity of preventing future attacks by not being
able to detect the attack, the cost associated with adversary-
induced decoding error or failure, the false alarm cost, and
the ease of a deceptive perturbation. We have designed the
detection rule against the worst-case attacker who maximizes
the cost metrics by knowing the designed defense, i.e., under
the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium where the
defender is the leader. We have provided a relaxation on
the attacker’s strategy space in order to mitigate possible
computational issues that might arise while computing the
equilibrium when there is a large number of distinct road signs.
This has enabled us transform the problem into an LP with
considerably small computational complexity. Finally, we have
examined the performance numerically over various scenarios.
The proposed game theoretical framework brings in new
research directions for the applications of smart road signs in
intelligent transportation systems. In the following, we identify
some of these future research directions:
● We emphasize that sensor fusion where we collect infor-
mation through several separate sources can lead to more
resilient and robust systems [37]. In the future, smart road
signs combined with state-of-the-art vision-based road-
sign recognition algorithms can provide both reliable and
effective recognition by smart vehicles.● A network of smart vehicles can lead to more reliable
traffic networks. Particularly, a detection mechanism faces
a trade-off between detecting an adversarial intervention
and avoiding false alarms. Since a road sign would be
encountered by multiple smart vehicles, those vehicles
can share the false alarm cost against an attack on the
road sign. Similar to herd immunity [38], a herd of smart
vehicles can achieve more reliable road sign recognition.● Additionally, this approach can also be a good fit for other
classification problems that can be viewed as a signaling
problem, where we can incorporate visual smart codes
while transmitting information. For example, computer
vision for (warehouse) inventory management [39] or
intelligent robotic sorting [40] would constitute other
interesting applications for the framework developed here.
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